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Preface
This paper is the result of several consecutive semesters of working towards the same overall
goal. First, the lion’s share of my gratitude goes to Professor Adolph Reed for his countless
hours, both consoling me about Florida State’s (recently improved) poor sports performance and
my pursuit of understanding this idea about the aspects of transportation that intermingle so
prominently with race.
Another professor who has had an immeasurable impact on this piece has been Ariel
Ben-Amos. His class opened my eyes to the field of planning’s imperfections, leading me to
question these seemingly immortal planners’ judgment and teaching the incredible value of
primary sources in the analysis of these actions.
This task at hand has been facilitated by countless other classes and experiences here at
Penn, including Harold Dibble’s Quantitative Analysis of Anthropologic Data and Ira
Goldstein’s Urban Research Methods, each of which reinforced the quantitative section and
methods that form the bedrock of this paper.
Furthermore, the data’s processing has been facilitated by the College of Arts and
Sciences’ ESRI ArcGIS and IBM SPSS licenses, using data from the United States Department
of Transportation, United States Department of Commerce, and the National Historical
Geographic Information System’s TIGER Files and 1960 Data Sets. Without any one of these
factors working together so seamlessly, this project could not have come to fruition.
On a personal note, I’d like to take a moment and thank my parents for facilitating my
education at this estimable institution and allowing me the leeway to develop my own course of
study here, as well as leading into my next step towards graduate school. Truly, they have been
inspirational throughout my academic career, and I am fortunate that they have been such a
consistent source of support. I would also take a second to thank my charming sister for her
color commentary and upbeat discussions on those long evenings after data crunching, and the
perfect pets Chevy, Lady, and Peanut. With this consistent support at home, I have been able to
pursue this goal with project with the dedication it deserved and required.

Sherman 1

Introduction
Few programs have as indelibly shaped the American canvas the interstate highway system.
Originally conceived as a method of movement for soldiers in time of war, the highway system
has morphed into a sprawling series of roads, largely aligned with one another, to facilitate the
speedy movement of large numbers over large distances. These roads function daily to move
millions of vehicles to their destinations, whether that be across the county or country, yet they
create a distinctive impact on the areas that directly surround them through their various
environmental and desirability impacts.
This essay, however, will not examine the nature of these consequences. Rather, we will
discuss the process that has led to their arrival, the interstate highway planning process. Our
examination will be centered on assessing the impact of neighborhood racial composition on
interstate highway planning. This will be done through both the use of qualitative and
quantitative methods, as are explained in the Structure section. However, this will require
shedding light on the inner nature of these highways, and it requires us to look at these
behemoths in different roles, though they fundamentally block, they also convey. These roles
are examined in the case studies with great detail, and it appears that both roles were
manipulated in different situations by the respective authorities.
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Structure
This essay will divide itself into a few readily apparent pieces. The first section, will be
discussing both the historical legacy and planning processes of highways. This is then followed
by a brief literature review which addresses the rather scant literature on this topic.
After a discussion of this history, the essay will enter the territory of a quantitative
analysis, where a t-test will be conducted in various urban areas, where the race as reported in
1960 will be compared to the presence or lack of a highway in the tract. This will be used to see
if the sample represents a proportional portion of the overall population of census tracts in the
area on the basis of race.
From these results, several of the states that had significant results were chosen for
further study. These states will be examined in the form of a miniature cast study which attempts
to answer with a degree of cross comparability why the test came back as it did, and what factors
may have caused this in the local political and planning environment.
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Historical Background
Originally, highways were thought of primarily as easing intra-city traffic, as a
replacement for the main arteries that cities felt were overburdened. In this system, much of the
nation’s commerce travels over these roads that stitch together the various parts of the nation into
one cohesive and relatively fluid market.1 Between 1921 and 1939, annual highway expenses
more than doubled to excess of $2 billion annually.2 Until the 1940’s, the vast majority of this
spending on highways was from the coffers of the states themselves, not the Federal government.
However, with the Highway Act of 1956, the Federal Bureau of Public Road was given the task
of determining the routing for new freeways in America, a dramatic shift from the earlier statecontrolled protocols.3 This dramatically increased the standardization of the highways, as well
as increasing the scale of the projects to an exceptional extent.
This federal protocol was singlehanded focused on inexpensive methods for ameliorating
automobile congestion in cities. However, these federally mandated methods shifted a large
degree of control from the city itself to federal and state transportation planners, which may have
contributed to the unique, and often culturally insensitive routes that the freeways created.4 With
a federal subsidy of 90% of the freeway’s cost, many cities jumped at the opportunity to accept

1

Charles L Dearing, American Highway Policy, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1942), 3.
Ibid.
3
Susan S Fainstein, Restructuring the City : The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment (New York:
Longman, 1983), 13.
4
Ibid., 14.
2
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federal funds for these highways, wherever the planners in Washington saw fit to place them,
rendering much of the feedback mechanisms put into place useless.
Concurrently with this time period, there was a shift toward suburbanization in the cities.
During the period from 1950-1960, the standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) around
Atlanta, Baltimore, Dallas, Cleveland, Houston, San Diego, and Passaic all experienced growth
in excess of 20%.5 While there was this major SMSA growth, the central cities in that list grew
by a factor much smaller than the overall SMSA growth.6 This outside growth required cities to
shift their transportation planning focus on intra-city arteries to inter-community road networks
that would alleviate the strain on the city’s roads created by people who were simply passing
through the area in order to reach their destinations.
Especially notable about this trend was the sharp uptick in car ownership in many overall
MSA, while the center cities’ citizens’ car ownership remained relatively flat, resulting in a net
increase of long distance commuters which further strained central transportation amenities.7
For cities like Atlanta, Cleveland, Dallas, and Milwaukee, nearly half of the SMSA residents live
in the suburbs but work in the center cities themselves by 1960.8 This demographic shift with so
many commuters heading into the city on a daily basis changes the overall requirement from the
roads being a local concern to a regional issue.
This dependence on motor vehicles has only worsened over time. In 1960, as the
interstate highway system was first being constructed, only 64% of commuters did so by car;

5

General Research Corporation and United States. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Systems Analysis of
Urban Transportation (Santa Barbara, Ca.: General Research Corp., 1968), 15.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., 18.
8
Ibid.
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however, by 1990, that number had jumped to 86.5%, of which 73.2% drove exclusively alone,
and the remaining portion carpooled occasionally (which was a percentage that had fallen rather
precipitously from its height in 1980 when it was first asked).9
It is the unique confluence of these two situations, the availability of federal funds and
the heightening stress on the public road systems that prompted the explosion of the interstate
highway network across America.

9

Means of Transportation to Work for the US (United States Census, 1990),
http://www.census.gov/hhes/commuting/files/1990/mode6790.txt.

Sherman 6

Highway Planning Process
Planning for urban highways is theoretically done as pieces of a long-term plan, usually a
published roadmap outlining overall goals that the area seeks to achieve through new
transportation construction.10 These overall plans should allow for the construction of a “grand
narrative” of sorts for the region’s transportation planning, and it is a requirement imposed by the
legislation that grants federal aid for transportation funds.
The federal stipulations state that the plans must both take into account all of the relative
inputs for the travel needs and systems as well as the potential costs and benefits of the designed
system.11 However, this second prong is not as inclusive as it might seem.
Primarily, the legislation requires the plan to focus on the aspects of the transportation
system’s overall costs, for example the increased stress on the roads that are the route’s exits that
is imposed by backtracking from the exit to the desired roads or the retiming of lights due to
changes in throughput. Very little emphasis was placed on the cultural significance or other
intangibles that affected the construction process.12
Federal Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) regulations required that every urbanized area
larger than 50,000 people have some form of centralized planning body in order to be eligible for
federal aid.13 This centralization led to the creation of the artifice of a “balanced system.”14 The
balanced system concept dictated that all regions, and sub-regions have the ability to provide as

10

Anthony R. Tomazinis, An Introduction to Urban Transportation Planning, Emerging Techniques and Theories
(Philadelphia, 1967), 19.
11
Ibid., 20.
12
Ibid.
13
RJ Henson and WL Grecco, “An Information Manual On the Urban Transportation Planning Process for
Technical Committees in Smaller Urban Areas” (Joint Highway Research Project, February 1970), 2,
http://ia700401.us.archive.org/19/items/informationmanua00hens/informationmanua00hens_bw.pdf.
14
Tomazinis, An Introduction to Urban Transportation Planning, Emerging Techniques and Theories, 23–4.
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much transportation as the area demands.15 In practice, however, there is an emphasis on
reaching as many of these equilibria as possible due to strained resources precluding complete
balancing of the system. 16
This dictates that the policy makers must either create a few major policy objectives to
complete or balance the transportation only in a certain few areas. Frequently, when routing
these highways socio-economic and racial distribution is heavily figured into the mix through
several different implicit mechanisms, such as property valuation or limited access roads.17

15

Ibid., 24.
Ibid., 25.
17
Ibid.
16
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Openness in Planning
The Federal Highway Administration has outlined the exact provisions for the openness in
highway planning. In it, the Federal Highway Administration assures that “Public involvement
processes shall be proactive and provide complete information, timely public notice, full public
access to key decisions, and opportunities for early and continuing involvement.”18
In practice, however, this guarantee is less serviceable. When discussing his role
at the California Division of Highways, Robert J. Datel essentially boiled it down to a two-step
process.19 First, the FHA would find the elected leaders of the area and ask their opinions, then
the FHA would go about locating the “leaders of every facet” of the area, such as the bishops,
pastors, editors, anybody of considerable influence. After these two steps were completed, the
FHA would make its decision. In the same report, the FHA memorandum specifies that “the
planner must remember that he is a public servant whose job it is to reflect the public’s values in
his technical decisions.”20
An area of note, however, is that the formal FHA regulations permit, and often
encourage, the combining of the design and location public hearings on the construction of new
routes.21 On one hand, this I reasonable, as the design stage is largely vetted in the
environmental impact survey, and its mandatory hearing, long before the location stage can
begin; however, there is also the competing notion that often times this second hearing is geared
towards a much less technical audience than the environmental impact survey’s hearing, which

18

Public Involvement, 23 CFR 450.212
Desoto Jordan and United States. Federal Highway Administration, Effective Citizen Participation in
Transportation Planning : Final Report (Washington: U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration, Socio-Economic Studies Division, 1976), 10.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid., 14.

19

Sherman 9
generally requires a strong background in engineering and environmental issues to be
understood.22 This renders many planning work products difficult to understand to the average
interested citizen, serving as an implicit form of discrimination against less educated people.

22

Ibid.
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New Regionalism
In the past few decades, a phenomenon known as “New Regionalism” has taken hold in the
country, asserting that because of the interdependence of the cities and their suburbs, they should
be served by the same planning agencies.23 Agencies such as the Tennessee Valley Authority,
the Appalachian Regional Commission, and numerous sub-state and metropolitan planning
authorities have sprung up in recent years to provide a more cohesive overall plan for these
areas.24
The majority of metropolitan regional councils were established in the delicate timeframe
between 1966 and 1971.25 The role for a regional planning in metropolitan regions began in the
interwar period, but this was generally of an advisory role, without a public structure.26
However, from 1954 onward, federal funds were made available to facilitate regional planning
bodies, but by 1960, only 36 of the eventual 659 had been formed. In 1965, however, a critical
shift happened in the federal government whereupon the regional planning council-type of
government was also awarded funding.27 This was a major shift as it incentivized the elected
officials inside of the region to create a regional planning board in order to receive funding for it
(and their potential service on it).

23

J. B Cullingworth, The Political Culture of Planning : American Land Use Planning in Comparative Perspective
(New York: Routledge, 1993), 162.
24
Frank S So et al., The Practice of State and Regional Planning (Chicago, Ill.: Published in cooperation with the
International City Management Association by the American Planning Association, 1986).
25
United States. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State and Local Roles in the Federal
System. (ACIR, 1982).
26
Ibid., 268.
27
Ibid.
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Upon the receipt of this funding, the paradigm for transportation planning shifted from
the macroscopic state level, as in Virginia, to the metropolitan area level.28 This shift, however,
most adversely affected the cities, which were held to be the most multifunctional units of
government. These metropolitan planning organizations are frequently encouraged through
federal block grants and the like in order to consolidate health planning and social services
distribution over the region.29

28

Herrington J. Bryce, Urban Governance and Minorities (New York; [Washington]: Praeger Publishers ;
published in cooperation with the Joint Center for Political Studies, 1976).
29
Ibid.
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Caveats of New Regionalism
Continuing to blur the lines between strata of government is difficult enough; however when it is
constantly shifting, the MPO’s provide even more overlap and concurrent planning power.30 The
black-letter job of the MPO’s is to “coordinate and supervise” their districts; however, what
degree of work each of those roles entails varies substantially with the shifting interests and
desires of the relevant parties in the states’ politics. Some of these organizations were largely
toothless and dependent on their constituent municipalities, while others were a dissenting voice
from their underlying planning regimes.
An issue which further makes these MPO’s distinctive is that, instead of relying on the
coercive power of government, the MPO often has to settle for coordinating cooperation among
different governments, even at different levels.31 This combination of overlapping jurisdictions
greatly increases the number of times when possible biases could be induced into the system.
These different levels magnified the scope of the issues at hand, diluting the power, and it served
to increase dramatically the number of different entities involved in the planning process,
complicating the task of assigning ownership or responsibility for any given idea, as well as
opening up a can of worms insofar as the social harm caused by a given project through the
increased degree of insularity of these new organizations. With a more complete understanding
of the history or the patchwork organizations and legislations that created the present highway
planning system, this paper now enters the discussion at hand.

30

Ronald K. Vogel and Norman Nezelkewicz, “Metropolitan Planning Organizations and the New Regionalism:
The Case of Louisville,” Publius 32, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 107–129, doi:10.2307/3331076.
31
Ibid.
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Review of Relevant Literature
This is a piece of work which is relatively unprecedented in scale, but the greater field has a
distinct appreciation for the effect on the urban fabric that these massive infrastructure projects
have wreaked. Though these largely sociologic roots have dictated many of the processes that
have been used in the field, they are generally eschewing quantitative metrics in favor of
qualitative case studies as well as normative logic.
During the early parts of the designing of formalized transportation planning, Alfred
Aman has voiced that there needs to be legislative protections guaranteed to affected parties in
planning disputes for interstate highways.32 To an extent, the issue was exacerbated by itself, as
Kuswa argues, because the interstates enabled and accelerated the pace of suburbanization,
making a daily commute viable for an increasingly large portion of the workforce.33
Rabin voices most clearly the discrimination that this paper assumes is the correct
response, that the highways are functioning both to enable suburbanization as well as prevent the
inner-city minorities from being able to reap the benefits from this process.34 In a nature this is
the discrimination of the vehicular enabled majority over those who are less able to utilize the
freedom of movement granted by the interstate highways.

32

Alfred C. Jr Aman, “Urban Highways: The Problems of Route Location and a Proposed Solution,” Journal of
Urban Law 47 (1970 1969): 817.
33
Kevin Douglas Kuswa, “Suburbification, Segregation, and the Consolidation of the Highway Machine,” Journal
of Law in Society 3 (2002): 31.
34
Yale Rabin, “Highways as a Barrier to Equal Access,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 407, no. 1 (May 1, 1973): 63–77, doi:10.1177/000271627340700106.
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Part of the assertion of this paper rests upon the literature of sprawl. Sprawl has become
“a fact of life in urban America.”35 Much of this phenomenon has come at the expense of the
urban cores, which were made less hospitable by virtue of their accessibility from the interstates.
On the other hand, Leavitt takes a more cynical view of citizen participation in planning
politics. Leavitt’s argument is based on the idea of a risk-reward tradeoff for interstate
construction.36 Leavitt sees the primary reason for political participation in blocking a project is
the lack of a vested interest in its success. For example, Leavitt discusses the extension of the
Massachusetts Turnpike into the heart of Boston, which was spearheaded by three of the city’s
largest developers and contractors: John Volpe37, Mayor John Collins, and Louis Perini.38 All
three of these major actors were able to successfully “buy off” various constituencies through
horse trading with other concessions in Boston and Cambridge, allowing the turnpike extension
to come to fruition and greatly benefit all three.
Wright discusses the caveats of placing the Interstate 10 extension through the heart of
the Treme neighborhood in New Orleans.39 This placement came after the initial idea to route
the highway down the Vieux Carre was successfully resisted by a committed coalition of local
residents of the French Quarter, largely enabled through widespread mobilization throughout the
community.40 As a response to this, it was decided to relocate the I-10 project to the northern

35

Robert D Bullard, Glenn S Johnson, and Angel O Torres, Sprawl City: Race, Politics, and Planning in Atlanta
(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2000).
36
Helen Leavitt, Superhighway--Superhoax. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970).
37
This is the same John Volpe who would later rise to be Secretary of Transportation. He was also a former
president of the Associated General Contractors of America.
38
Leavitt, Superhighway--Superhoax.
39
Beverly H. Wright, “New Orleans Neighborhoods Under Siege,” in Just Transportation: Dismantling Race and
Class Barriers to Mobility, ed. Robert D. Bullard and Glenn S. Johnson (Gabriola Island, BC ; Stony Creek, CT:
New Society Publishers, 1997), 120–44.
40
Richard O Baumbach and William E Borah, “The Second Battle of New Orleans a History of the Vieux Carré
Riverfront Expressway Controversy,” 1980, 241, http://books.google.com/books?id=6KEqAQAAMAAJ.
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edge of the city, and this would run directly down Claiborne Avenue, in the heart of the Black
Business District.41 This avenue was the “heart” of the Black Mardi Gras celebration in the city,
and the routing down the middle of the avenue in its “neutral ground,” a strip one-hundred feet
wide that was used widely for walking and other community activities was highly
controversial.42 Ford attributes this willful negligence to the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954
which allowed cities to hire consultants to draft these plans to open up space and improve
accessibility to the urban core.43
However, Los Angeles, and to a lesser extent many other Western cities grew from the
embrace of the freeways.44 These cities have used the freeway to facilitate the low density urban
fabric that has become their trademark characteristic. These cities eschew the traditional urban
spoke and hub system of suburbanization, instead favoring to have a relatively equal density
development throughout a given area, with expressways providing the connective tissue among
them.45 Part of the issue with this type of development that Brodsly notes is there is generally
poor integration of the freeway with the surrounding community. Often times, people are unable
to locate freeways without their signage indicating it, and very seldom are people on freeways
fully cognizant of the neighborhoods through which they are passing.46 However, even in the
west, these projects were often routed through the most indigent areas of the city both to mitigate
potential blowback on the project as well as right of way acquisition costs.47 For example, the
Harbor Freeway in Los Angeles, California was routed directly through the Watts section of the

41

Wright, “New Orleans Neighborhoods Under Siege.”
Ibid.
43
Kristina Ford, The Trouble with City Planning: What New Orleans Can Teach Us (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2010), 85.
44
David Brodsly, L.A. Freeway, an Appreciative Essay (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
45
Ibid., 23.
46
Brodsly, L.A. Freeway, an Appreciative Essay.
47
Ibid., 39.
42
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city, which was largely done at a depressed grade, with a few overpasses for local streets.48
Many original plans, however, saw these freeways as being a “functional sculpture” in the area,
creating an enhancement to the surrounding communities.49 This was a fundamental dichotomy
present in many of the early highways, their role as a utilitarian form of architectural art as well
as their function to aid in movement.
Otherwise, though much has been made of this distinction and the perception of racial
bias in the locations of interstate highways, few scholarly reports have risen above the anecdotal
level in analyzing their placement. This paper seeks to address this gap.

48
49

Brodsly, L.A. Freeway, an Appreciative Essay.
Ibid., 49.
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Quantitative Section
Detailed Methods
As discussed earlier, the quantitative discussion of the country centers on a combination of
various mapping and statistical techniques to examine if there is a macroscopic correlation
between the racial composition of a census tract and the presence of a highway. Firstly, the 1960
Census data from NHGIS50 was mapped into tracts. This created a series of clusters around the
major urban areas of the country.
The mapping software used was ArcMap. This software is able to associate the spatial
relations among different data sets, as well as create maps of each based on the various attributes
of it, many of which will be used later in this paper.
On top of these tracts, the Federal Highway Administration’s National Highway Planning
Network was overlaid. This is the FHA’s own method of cataloguing the highways throughout
the country. Furthermore, this overlay includes differentiators to eliminate the many new
highways built since the Eisenhower Interstate Highway was largely planned during its
namesake President’s administration.
After filtering many of the newer highways and spurs, the urban tracts were examined to
qualify the ones that were intersecting or within fifty meters of one of these interstate’s
centerline. This additional fifty meter buffer is critical as each of these interstate is drawn as a
single line, without any inherent width in the GIS mapping projection. Thus, the 50 meters is

50

Minnesota Population Center. National Historic Geographic Information System: Version 2.0. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota 2011.
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used as a rough approximation, 100 meters on either side, of the width of the interstate highway
itself. This allows our highway presence variable to indicate the presence of a highway, even if
it straddles or borders two or more tracts.
Both of these samples were clipped to the lower forty-eight United States and the District
of Columbia. The reasoning for this is twofold: we have insufficient census data to justify
inclusion of the territories and Alaska, as well as there are relatively few tracts without an
interstate highway in Hawaii, which hindered the ability to statistically analyze those tracts.
Thus, both of these states and the US territories were discarded from the studied data set, which
corresponds closely with the original Eisenhower Interstate system otherwise.
The key aspect to this quantitative analysis is its exploration from an objective
standpoint, without any perceptible bias introduced other than the. However, this method does
not do any justice for areas with geographic barriers or other methods that differentiate the tracts
from one another, such as rivers or the like, which may affect the contiguity of the maps.
However, on this macroscopic scale, it is an incredibly effective tool for this purpose of studying
the placement of the highways in relation to the demographics of the surrounding communities.
This attributing was then used to examine by way of an Independent Samples t-test if the
tracts were randomly distributed into one group or another, or if there were patterns of
discrimination occurring that biased the selection into hosting a highway or not. This t-test
grouping was then stratified based on the states, as well as grouped into several regions, to
examine if there was a consistent pattern amongst the states in an area.
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Overall Results51
The t-tests had mixed results in the study, but often times these were the results of individual
states affecting disproportionately the overall means.52 For example, when one studies the
traditional core of the southeast, the results are as follows:

Core Southeast (FL, GA,AL, MS, NC,SC,TN) Independent Samples Test
Levene's
Test for
Equality of
Variances

Proportion
NonWhite

Equal
variances
assumed

F
.225

Sig.
.635

Equal
variances
not
assumed
Proportion
Black

Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

.193

.660

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference

t
-2.199

df
1657

Sig.
(2tailed)
.028

-2.192

1175.008

.029

-.03653226

.01666397

-.06922671

-.00383781

-2.323

1656

.020

-.03885267

.01672281

-.07165275

-.00605259

-2.322

1180.831

.020

-.03885267

.01672973

-.07167597

-.00602936

Mean
Difference
-.03653226

Std. Error
Difference
.01661532

Lower
-.06912150

Upper
-.00394302

However, these data are not as clear as the probabilities may initially indicate, and if we exclude
Florida, the results shift to become an insignificant difference with the two samples differing by
mere tenths of a percentage which paints a dramatically different picture of the state of the
interstate system in the Southeast and its intersection with the racial composition of the area.
Part of this is a demonstration of the incredible power of a single state, Florida, with an
exceptionally strong correlation in the two categories, largely as a result of the pull that Tampa,
Florida has on the state’s overall results.
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For the full results of each state studied, see the appendix. This section will only include a subset of the data
tables, and it will focus on regional combinations and outliers.
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The significance level used for our examination was p>.10.
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Modified Southeast (GA,AL, MS, NC,SC,TN) Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
F
Equal
variances
assumed
Proportion
Equal
Non-White
variances
not
assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Proportion
Equal
Black
variances
not
assumed

Sig.

4.92

5.297

0.027

0.022

Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
F
Proportion Equal
Non-White variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed
Proportion Equal
Black
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

31.846

35.709

Sig.
.000

.000

t-test for Equality of Means

t

Sig. (2tailed)

df

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower

Upper

-0.005

1240

0.996 -0.00009821

0.019335

-0.038032

0.0378356

-0.005

1046.775

0.996 -0.00009821

0.019102

-0.037582

0.0373853

-0.025

1239

0.98 -0.00049582

0.019496

-0.038744

0.0377522

-0.026

1052.133

0.979 -0.00049582

0.019213

-0.038196

0.037204

Florida Independent Samples Test
t-test for Equality of Means
t

Sig. (2tailed)

df

Mean
Std. Error
Difference Difference

95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower
Upper

-3.324

415

.001 -.10124459 .03045793 -.16111565 -.04137353

-2.814

139.199

.006 -.10124459 .03598205 -.17238661 -.03010258

-3.620

415

.000 -.10961273 .03028339 -.16914069 -.05008477

-3.050

138.452

.003 -.10961273 .03594219 -.18067930 -.03854615

This assortment of exceptional states is not in itself an exception, and each of these calls for a
heightened degree of scrutiny, both of the state’s planning mechanisms, as well as the processes
that led to the creation of these roads on a more localized level.
If we are to look outside of Florida, we can see a handful of other states which achieve
statistical significance in a similar fashion. These varied states warrant further inquiry into their
patterns and an examination of why these results occurred.
However, many of the Northeastern states had the opposite effect as Florida, where there
were statistically fewer non-white people in the tracts where highways ran. For example, in
New York and Pennsylvania, this effect was particularly striking.
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New York Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

F
Proportion Equal
Non-White variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed
Proportion Equal
variances
Black
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

39.259

46.708

Sig.
.000

.000

t-test for Equality of Means

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Std. Error
Lower
Upper
Difference

3.354

3382

.001

.03437175 .01024690

.01428100

.05446250

4.308

855.513

.000

.03437175 .00797808

.01871284

.05003066

3.645

3378

.000

.03681800 .01010007

.01701514

.05662086

4.891

913.895

.000

.03681800 .00752722

.02204535

.05159065
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Pennsylvania Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

F
Proportion Equal
Non-White variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed
Proportion Equal
variances
Black
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

31.292

34.543

Sig.

t-test for Equality of Means

t

.000

.000

df

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Std. Error
Lower
Upper
Difference

3.219

1982

.001

.03679054 .01142824

.01437791

.05920317

4.236

746.702

.000

.03679054 .00868482

.01974096

.05384012

3.402

1982

.001

.03874915 .01139125

.01640907

.06108924

4.506

756.638

.000

.03874915 .00859903

.02186836

.05562995

Mid-Atlantic (MD, DC, DE, NJ, NY, PA, VA, WV) Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t-test for Equality of Means

F
Proportion Equal
Non-White variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed
Proportion Equal
variances
Black
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

8.488

7.744

Sig.
.004

.005

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower
Upper

1.204

7551

.229

.00797834 .00662904 -.00501642

.02097310

1.264

2287.004

.206

.00797834 .00631283 -.00440113

.02035781

1.016

7184

.309

.00707382 .00695972 -.00656927

.02071691

1.071

2135.346

.285

.00707382 .00660786 -.00588469

.02003234

This region is an excellent example of the pitfalls of examining these patterns on a macroscopic
scale that can make a given region appear to be more or less exceptional than it actually is. Even
though this region includes both of these states which are singularly exceptional, the combined
means are not.
Part of this lies in the manner in which each is composed. For example, in New York,
the expected pattern where the non-white population should be higher in highway tracts is
reversed, markedly.
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New York Group Statistics
Binary Highway Presence
Proportion Non-White

No Highway Present
Highway Present

Proportion Black

No Highway Present
Highway Present

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

2899

.0958299

.21695977

.00402954

485

.0614582

.15164147

.00688568

2895

.0913307

.21485084

.00399312

485

.0545127

.14052158

.00638076

If we look at these means, they are almost 3% lower in the non-white and 4% lower in the black
areas that have highways than the general non-highway tract in New York State. This is an
interesting correlation among the tracts that causes a reversal of the expected difference, and it is
this reversal which prompts a line of further inquiry about the different rationales that led to the
choices of where to construct a highway.
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Data Based Conclusions
First off, the patterns of states tend not to be regionally based but rather a state and even locality
centric process. These different results tend to indicate that there are, in many areas, patterns of
racial inequality in the highway servicing of the area; however, these patterns are not as simple
or coherent as initially suggested by the literature.
The data makes clear the degree to which the former Jim Crow strongholds of Dixie were
not the hotbeds of unabashed governmental prejudice as was initially suggested and presumed by
the literature, with all of these states, save Florida, failing to have a significantly unequal
distribution of the highway amenity. Thus, we are now prompted to look more closely at the
individual situations that have led to these patterns to exist as they are reflected in the data.
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Data Driven Case Studies
With the understanding gained from analyzing the data, there were several cities that appeared to
be prime candidates for further examination. Each of these cities will first entail a brief
discussion of the legislative and planning mechanisms of the area, as well as a study of the maps
that caused the data’s conclusion to be reached.
These conclusions may shed some light onto the issues at hand in this discussion through
the comparison of several small scale case studies with information gathered on each of them in
a similar fashion, largely through the contemporary media, that may be useful when looking at
other examples that were outside of the scope of this study.
Many of the states which had significant t-tests did have a city which, when examined by
hand, appeared to demonstrate an interesting pattern in their city’s highway arrangement with
respect to race. Thus, it is the combination of the data and the evidence that led to the case
selection for this qualitative report.
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Tampa, Florida
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Judging from
the statistics,
Florida has
one of the
most
inequitable
distributions
in the country
as far as the
racial
allocation of
its interstate
highway
miles;
however, this
effect is
largely
dictated by a
few cores of
non-white population, in an otherwise sparsely populated state.
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Florida I-4, which cut through the heart of downtown Tampa opened in 1963, in a quick
buildout by the Florida Department of Transportation, which coordinated the building efforts
throughout the state.53
To serve these initial roads, the planners sought to buttress the urban arterial
networks that had existed in these cities with increased expansion and lane growths, which
displaced many urban residents.54 As the map clearly demonstrates, these urban roads also
tended to have the most non-white residents, and if we look at the sizable area that exists at the
intersection of Interstates 275 and 4 in the heart of Tampa, we can witness the degree to which
planners disregarded the interests of the historically immigrant, non-white communities of
downtown Tampa to create these megaliths of massive proportions through the heart of the city,
uprooting the area’s residents.
Much of the city’s growth stemmed from its proximity to the interstate highway and
connectivity with the rest of the state and the country.55 In the wake of these vast intrusions into
the urban core, the suburban nature that Florida now professes began to take shape, leading to the
vast acres of cookie cutter houses and golf courses that tarnish the otherwise hardy nature of the
south.56
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WRIGHT, “FLORIDA CROSSROAD.”
C.E.W, “FLORIDA HIGHWAYS: Link of Tampa Expressway Opens -- U.S. 1 Is Four-Laned at Stuart,” New
York Times, October 11, 1964, sec. RESORTS TRAVEL.
55
Martha Weinman Lear, “Look at All That Growth Fanning out There from Orlando,” New York Times, August 12,
1973, sec. SM.
56
Ibid.
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However, this suburbanization also benefited one of the perenially major lobbies in
Florida, the phosphate industry.57 This was an industry with thousands of acres of “blighted”
land formerly used for phosphate mining that had extended past its usable life. To enable this
development, the traditional cities in Florida needed to be made both accessible from these
former mines and less desirable than the city centers they were replacing. The erection of
highways through the heart of numerous Florida cities achieved both of these goals in an
alarmingly blatant and state-supported fashion.58
Florida had a unique mixture of ingredients that made the prejudicial nature of highway
planning in the state both clear and remarkably apalling. Florida had a need – to convey tourists
and residents to the centers of cities as speedily as possible, but it also saw a need to develop the
vast tracts of ecologically tarnished land that lay outside of these centers. With the intrusions of
the interstate system, it was able to accomplish both of these goals with remarkable precision.
Interstate 4 in Tampa is the result of this clear desire for the interstates to both run into, and in
many ways lead to the obsolescence of the state’s major cities.
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C. E. WRIGHT, “Industry Miracle in Florida: Phosphate Companies in Polk County Mend Their Ways, Reclaim
Blighted Areas for Recreation, Beautify Land,” New York Times, March 5, 1967, sec. Travel And Resorts,
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2095/docview/117566816/abstract/FE3C3AE0F9EF46B9PQ/3?accountid=14707.
58
C.E. Wright, “FLORIDA PUSHES $200,000,000 HIGHWAY PROGRAM,” New York Times, May 7, 1961,
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2095/docview/115413371/FE3C3AE0F9EF46B9PQ/11?accountid=14707.
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Phoenix, Arizona

Arizona is the next state in the list with a
significant difference between the two groups.
Another Sunbelt state, Arizona seems to have a
similar urban profile to Florida, with a few
large cities, in this case centered on Tucson and
Phoenix, and a vast expanse of land outside of
the borders of these two large cities.
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Prior to the construction of
Interstate 17 through its core,
Phoenix was seen as an “infant”
city in the Southwest, but this
allowed it to compete successfully
with the likes of Los Angeles for
building prices and commercial
headquarters touting the interests
of the landed gentry to turn their
plot of desert into a sprawling
mecca.59
Phoenix was the
centerpiece of the Arizona
Department of Transportation’s
plan for connecting the state via interstate highways, and the city of Phoenix has its center belted
by two of them, Interstate 17, which would continue onwards to the North, and Interstate 10, the
massive road spanning the south of the United States from Florida to California.60
In order to plan this, the state worked by dividing the downtown corridor into segments,
focused on Central Avenue, which lays in the heart of the city and runs north-south. Central
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Don G. Campbell, “Phoenix Growth Considered Unique in Stagnant Market: PHOENIX: Surprising Growth
Curve,” Los Angeles Times, May 30, 1982,
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2095/docview/153135979/82BE87354D5F4A4FPQ/3?accountid=14707.
60
Thomas Lesure, “Construction Splurge Reflects Arizona’s Confidence: Record Breaking Year Forecast,” Chicago
Tribune, November 15, 1959,
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2095/docview/182405300/6C73721EE3D442BPQ/11?accountid=14707.
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Avenue intersects both the Interstate 10 section of the loop to the north as well as the Interstate
17 section to the south.
However, this belt runs largely through traditionally black and neglected areas of southeastern Phoenix. In these areas, the highway was an at-grade strip, running with a wide right-ofway, while in the northern, and whiter part of the city it ran as a hybrid of a tunnel and sunken
highway. The different forms of these highways, which are in all other respects virtually
identical other than the neighborhoods through which they pass, demonstrate how a highway’s
effect on the surrounding community can either be mitigated by its form or exacerbated by it.
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Illinois

Illinois is a state which is, to an extent,
at odds with itself. Racially, Chicago
and its suburbs are the most non-white
portions of the state, with the other
metropolitan areas demonstrating an
almost aversion to disrupting the tracts
that are predominantly minority. Three
cities, Peoria, Joliet, and Chicago exist
that have routings that appear to have
racially motivated components, and
these will be examined in the coming
sections.
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Peoria
Unlike many of the cities we
have discussed, heretofore,
Peoria did not have a large
minority at the time of the 1960
Census. This third largest city in
Illinois, had a few tracts with a
significant minority population,
but largely, as this map clearly
demonstrates, the city itself was
white and non-minority.61 Thus,
it comes to little surprise that
even though there were
significant minority tracts along
the Illinois River, much of the
city’s downtown had developed far to the North, along Route 150 or War Memorial Drive.62
This divide, with the minorities located below the line was exacerbated by the
construction of Interstate 74 along this southern routing in Peoria, creating a clear racial
boundary running through the heart of the city that has persisted to this day, resulting in a culture
of neighborhood decay and high crime rates.
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Hal Foust, “STRATTON, IN RED FLANNELS, OPENS A BRIDGE: Tells Peorians of Big Spending Plans,”
Chicago Daily Tribune, December 13, 1958.
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“Carson’s Buying 35 Acres at Peoria for Development,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 14, 1961,
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2095/docview/183054225/1E056B97D3774EB4PQ/1?accountid=14707#.
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To this day, the neighborhood to the south of 74 and north of 474, South Peoria, is a
predominantly African-American neighborhood and riddled with crime.63 Even though South
Peoria was not cut through by the interstate system, the effect of Interstate 74 running on the
border of the neighborhood, and with 474 running on its southern edge, has led to a systematic
decline in the quality of life for the neighborhood’s residents, all done such that the suburban
Peorians are able to shuttle in and out of the northern downtown area effectively and without
having to encounter their geographically proximate fellow citizens to the south.
This sort of discrimination, where the neighborhood itself deteriorated largely as a result
of being cut off by the interstate is difficult to note in a large-scale quantitative study, but it is an
important effect that South Peoria is able to demonstrate with a remarkable degree of clarity.

Joliet

Considered a suburb of
Chicago, the Illinois city
of Joliet is the next
example of the presence
of race and borders
affecting the shape of
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“Shooting Victim Becomes First Peoria Homicide of 2014,” Journal Star, accessed February 7, 2014,
http://www.pjstar.com/article/20140205/News/140209556.
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both the interstate and the surrounding people.
Joliet first became embroiled in debate when the initial plan for Interstate 80 dividing the
city were rejected for tolling, as it would violate the then-position of the Bureau of Public Roads
that federal interstates should not be tolled.64 However, this section was hotly contested for the
removal of 316 houses in Joliet to allow for the highway to go along the southern edge of the
city.65 This skirting the city, however, then led the Interstate into the less white suburbs to the
south where it appears to have had a greater impact on the community as a dividing line between
the relatively affluent downtown area of Joliet and the southern communities just outside of it.
Joliet was a rather unique experience, where much of the urban core of the city was sliced
in half by Interstate 80.66 However, the opposition to the interstate centered on the routing of it
through West Park, a cornerstone of the city’s parks system.67 This was largely done to ease the
congestion on the city’s “Loop,” the commercial area of the city which lies to the north of the
proposed route, but the five interchanges on the highway could take as much as four blocks each,
which had a strongly detrimental effect on the south Joliet community.
Much of the issue in Joliet was tied to the lack of suitable housing stock for relocation in
the city.68 Many of the neighborhoods that were displaced on the south side of the city were
working class, and they were unable to cope with the rent intensification that was occurring in
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the other portions of the city. This, forced many of the residents of Joliet further south and west,
out of the city limits, as well as increasing the density beyond the designed capacity in the
remaining areas in the southern portion of the city. Much like Peoria, Joliet’s experience with
Interstate 80 was one of a dividing line through the city, drawn to keep out undesirable people
from the city’s central business district further north on the Illinois.
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Chicago
Few discussions of racial
prejudice are complete
without a discussion of the
City of Chicago. During
the beginning of the federal
aid highway system,
Chicago began to upgrade
many of its avenues to
being a full interstate
standards, thus making
them eligible for federal
maintenance and
construction funds.69
Of these, Interstate
90 and the connecting
Calumet expressway into the south side of Chicago were the most egregious from a single
relocation standpoint. These massive projects entailed a major relocation of people from the
West Side of Chicago.70 In the last phase of the project, the bridge over the Chicago River,
maritime and residential interests sparred over the proper method of reconciling the interests of
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merchants and their bots that used the Chicago River as well as the interests of the residents in
the area who opposed a higher bridge on the grounds that it would entail more seizure of
property as well as being esthetically unattractive.71
However, the opposition to the interstates in Chicago was most epitomized by that for the
Chicago Skyway, running to the Indiana border through the heart of South Chicago.72 Much of
these concerns were well-founded, as in the ensuing decades, the surrounding areas of the
Skyway became a “Toxic wasteland” and a superfund site, a relic of a bygone industry and
impenitent dereliction for years.73 However, this expressway had been planned as a major boon
to prevent this dereliction.74
Fundamentally, there is a combination of various factors that contribute to Chicago’s
composition as a statistically significant entity in the macroeconomic scale, and the
neighborhoods of the southeastern end of the city bear witness to the gravity of this effect. Due
to the construction of these concrete and asphalt megaliths, many of which have severely
constrained access due to the mandates of the highway construction standards and a need to
prevent excessive eminent domain usage. The combination of these two factors contributes
heavily to the overall sentiment that the south side of Chicago has suffered more from these
structures than it was aided, even if the Aldermen from these wards initially did support these
structure for the opposite of these reasons during the pre-war period.
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Chicago’s network of overhead expressways, however, also are symbolic of a greater
desire to avoid the city and the factors that go with it. Unlike an at-grade expressway which is
confronted consistently with the terrain that surrounds it, an elevated one only sees its
constraining walls and the overall skyline. Part of this reflects the post-war consensus that the
city itself is inferior by virtue of its urbanity than the suburb, and the census tracts of the south
side of Chicago became a proxy in this war of different norms.
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Missouri

Nestled deeply in the Midwest,
Missouri was the next state to
experience a significant result on the
quantitative tests. In this states, there
are three major population centers.
On either side of the state, bordering
Kansas and Illinois are Kansas City
and St. Louis, respectively. Both of
these cities sit along the Interstate 70
corridor, which stitches together
much of the middle of the country
from Maryland into Utah. The third
major urbanized area in this Missouri
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is the city of Springfield, which was built along a prominent plateau in the Ozarks, with most
residents hailing from the Southeastern states, as opposed to Northeastern migrants who
otherwise comprised the state.75 This city has only Interstate 44 to the far northern edge of the
city, which is then linked to Interstate 49 to the west of the city linking it to Kansas City.
The Missouri Department of Transportation is the agency tasked with the construction
and planning of the interstate highway system within the state’s borders.76 From this central
agency came all of the state’s highway plans, many of which were the same ones implemented in
the cities of Missouri.
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St. Louis
St. Louis is a city built straddling the
Illinois-Missouri border, with the
mighty Mississippi river running in
the heart of the downtown, where the
border between the two states sits.
As the map to the right shows,
the Missouri downtown was divided
by the construction of Interstates 64
and 44 with Interstate 70 lining the
bank of the Mississippi River.
On the Illinois side, only
Interstate 55 and 70 enter the
urbanized areas, and these link up
with the more obtrusively planned areas on the Missouri side. This Interstate 70 on the west side
of the Mississippi was named the Mark Twain Expressway, and it served as the Missouri model
for limited access expressways.77
However, on the Illinois side of the river, much of the initial Interstate 55 was not built to
interstate standards.78 This signified that the interstate highway, though signed as one was
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actually US Route 66 and maintained that initial standard, with at-grade rail and cross-traffic
crossing that were implied by this.
On the other hand in Missouri, MoDOT was eager to finish the crossing of the
Mississippi to Interstate standards, and they continued the pace of building the interstate system
through the heart of St. Louis’s downtown areas.79 Much of Interstate 64 follows the routing of
the railroad through the heart of St. Louis, and then it diverges from this path however to follow
the southern edge of Forest Park, which is the largest park in downtown St. Louis.
In St. Louis, this park is bordered to the north by the traditionally working class
neighborhoods in the city. These areas are unique, as the finishing of Interstate 170, while
initially envisioned has never come to fruition.80 This, it can be inferred is partially due to the
racial composition to the south of Interstate 170, which would entail going through some of the
most white neighborhoods of the city, such as Lindenwood Park, which have existed largely as
neighborhoods to escape the inner cities that have developed over the past decades since the
development of the interstate system made these bedroom communities viable.81 Thus, St. Louis
arranged its interstates in a method of racial segregation with dramatically different racial
compositions on either side.
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Springfield
Springfield is a fascinating
city to include in this
discussion, not for its
inclusion of the interstate in
the city’s limited minority
presence, but rather its
complete avoidance.
Interstate 44 went
through this area as a
replacement to the strained
Norton Road in the northern
edge of the city.
When the third largest
city in a state is skipped, it is
generally a larger discussion,
but it bears reminding that Springfield, as the map shows rather poignantly had a racial divide,
albeit less severe than that see in St. Louis and other cities heretofore that dictated that the
residents to the north were more worthy of receiving this amenity to enable them to travel
speedily to St. Louis.
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This was seen as the gateway to the Ozarks on a national scale, but in Springfield the
politics it entailed was strictly local.82 Springfield had a traditional, “side of the track” based
racial distribution, as the map bears out, and by having the interstate run on a separate right of
way even further to the north, it further constrained the ability of people from the south side of
the railroad to access it by forcing them to use one of the few bridges over the sunken tracks in
the heart of the city.
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Kansas City
Built at the confluence of the
Kansas and Missouri rivers,
Kansas City is split between
the namesakes of its two
rivers, Kansas and Missouri.
Of these two states, Missouri
is the primary concern, and
Kansas did not test
statistically significant in any
metric.
However, the results
in Missouri were more mixed
with the Interstate 70
bisecting the city in its route
from St. Louis. This route,
though it did accomplish the purpose of reaching westward, went in a circuitous manner through
many of the non-white neighborhoods in the city. Unfortunately, the Kansas City Star’s archives
prior to 1991 are limited on this matter, and there are few resources that could be found to lend
more explanation as to what transpired in this situation for this routing which appears to have
been constructed to evade the neighborhood’s parks, at the expense of the residents themselves.
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Massachusetts

As the group statistics demonstrate, the
significance in the case of Massachusetts
is more based on a small difference
between the two groups, measured in a
few percentage points.
However, this is most clearly
demonstrated in discussion about
Boston, the state’s capital, and its
metropolitan area.
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Boston
Massachusetts was
one of the many states that
had developed an extensive
expressway system prior to
the Federal Aid Highway
Act. The Massachusetts
Turnpike, which runs eastwest through the heart of
Boston aroused controversy
not for its limited
displacement in Boston,
where it largely follows the
Charles River, but rather its
routes out in the suburbs of
the city where the interstate
was seen to have a
deleterious impact upon property values, creating a “highway menace” that would adversely
affect both the ability of children to go to school as well as their homes’ crime rate.83
As the city had been planned, it was designated that I-95 would function as the
Northeast and Southwest Expressways, linked by a central belt of I-695 which would also link
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with I-93 and US 3.84 This inner belt, however, was never constructed after there were extensive
protests from the residents of the proposed route.85
Route 128 (Also known as the Yankee Division Highway) was to serve as the western
link between the two ends of I-95, which wholly bypasses the city of Boston proper. The length
of Route 128 was created in 1933, during the early part of the highway mystique, and much of it
was built to adequate freeway standards, allowing MassDOT to use it as a replacement for I-695,
even though they were originally intended to work in tandem with Route 128 as the Outer Belt
and I-695 as the Inner Belt.86
Since that time, Route 128 has served as a divisive highway separating the communities
of Woburn, Newton, and South Quincy from one side to the other.87 However, all of these
suburban massive growths were done to preserve the urban core. Originally, all of these
converged into the highway known as the “central artery” which ran through the predominantly
non-minority sections of Boston nearer the Charles.88 This Central Artery was largely
submerged by the now-infamous “Big Dig” project which undertook the process of reclaiming
much of downtown Boston nearer the harbor from this elevated highway.89
All of these designs mean that Boston has actually gone to great lengths to preserve the
contiguity of minority neighborhoods, even if it comes at the expense of its suburban, and whiter
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residents. However, though at first blush this may appear magnanimous, it is more pragmatic
and harmful than it appears. Like in Springfield, by ignoring these sections of Boston, the
people who live in them are unable to reap the benefits that come from the construction of these
highways. As Boston failed to build its interior belt inside of Route 128 which would have
alleviated this issue, the people in these areas are compelled to travel long distances on often
constrained routes in order to reach effective infrastructure for their long-distance movements.
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Maryland

Maryland is similar to most of the
states it borders in that the non-white
average in the non-highway tracts is
actually higher than that in the
highway tracts.90 This is again
different from the conclusions that
were reached in the literature;
however, Maryland experienced
effective resistance to inner city
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expressways in its only major conurbation, Baltimore.
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Baltimore
An examination of the inner
city of Baltimore reveals that many of
the expressways are around the city in
a broadly drawn loop, as opposed to
cutting through the largely minority
sections of the inner city.
Part of the opposition to
drawing a tighter loop stemmed from
Maryland’s early construction of the
Baltimore-Frederick Expressway
through the inner city, which links
with the Interstate 95 in Downtown
Baltimore, which effectively serves as
a limited access expressway.91 This early highway project demonstrated to the, largely white,
population on the inside of the loop, that highway projects had sizable caveats for nearby
residents, leading to the routing of the freeways through many of the more non-white tracts in the
city.
Beyond the route of Interstate 83, which was built along the railroad tracks running into
the downtown, until it goes due south at its end, to become briefly an elevated expressway in a
commercial area, until it becomes a standard boulevard at its end. This routing is laudable
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relative to the conventional routing to follow the tracks, as that would have involved going
deeper into the residential downtown neighborhoods further to the east, which would have
caused increased disruption to the city. This routing was the result of extensive protest and
political mobilization, which was required in order to run the Jones Fall Expressway into
downtown Baltimore.92 In this situation, it was directly based on African-American advocacy in
the planning process that the Jones Falls Expressway was constructed on the routing that was
eventually selected and acted upon.
However, Baltimore’s harbor residents were successful in rejecting a controversially
designed bridge to go over the inner harbor in favor of a tunnel.93 The Interstate 95 Link through
the city was one of the final projects undertaken in the northeast interstate, and it was a hotly
contested compromise that led to the effected routing.94 This route actually managed to avoid
most of the densely populated areas of Baltimore and the surrounding harbor, especially through
the usage of a tunnel where it can later reunify with the outer harbor tunnel to form the John F.
Kennedy Memorial Highway.
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Conclusions
Much of the work in the preceding sections has been focused on the demonstration of the
methods used to undertake the quantitative examination, as well as some basic case study results.
Each of these sections is open to increased criticism and inquiry throughout the coming scholarly
discourse on this issue.
The areas where this paper has both made the most progress and is most vulnerable are in
its scope and its methods. These two critiques are intermingled on the same core tenet: the cliché
of all politics being local, and they are the result of consciously made decisions during the
experimental design process that has culminated in this paper.
Finally, the concluding remarks will revisit the distinctions and values that may be
gleaned from this examination, as well as final takeaways granted by the piece’s completion.
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Scope
Part of the allure of this study is its national scale. Indeed, this study demonstrates, with a high
degree of clarity, that these issues occur on a much smaller scale than was previously indicated.
The primary conclusion that has been drawn time and again, that these projects take place in a
much smaller scale than the national scale can discuss.
Each paradigm has its own rules and actors, and any examination from this macroscopic
scale is, by design, unable to appreciate this variation for the benefit of increased breadth. This
is the first regret of this paper, the inability of covering local politics to a level which was
provides too much meaningful discussion of the interstate projects. Yes, there was, through the
process of newspaper scouring, the ability to shed light on certain projects, however, almost
without fail, this was done in isolation without a knowledge of the greater political climate of the
area, and as such it marks the primary area for further inquiry.
With such a large scope, there is very little ability to craft the narratives that transformed
each of these communities. This translates to a portion of the story being lost of muddied in the
translation of the communities by directly juxtaposing them against one another as is done in this
paper. Indeed, this sort of differentiation can be seen as a potential fly in the ointment for this
sort of macroscopic scale examination of the racial prejudices involved in the construction of the
interstate highway system, and this omission of the microscopic for the macroscopic, though
regrettable, was intentional.
For example, Chicago is a prominent city with a slew of different actors, such as Mayor
Richard J. Daley, who among many others could have been named in the furtherance of this
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piece. However, in this scale, the individual names and faces, and even to a lesser extent the
distinguishing characteristics of the places are almost irrelevant as compared to the overarching
narrative of these communities and how the interstate highway system was planned.
In this sense, the ethnographic roots of this study have been eschewed in favor of
increasing the scale and applicability of the overall paper’s conclusions to seek out if there were
any consistent racial biases in the planning process.
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Methods
From the beginning, the methods of this paper have been statistically difficult to obtain, and they
are open to considerable criticism. For example, the use of census tracts as the examination
criteria, though required by the use of old data, does obfuscate the results substantially, as these
tracts are often times quite large, and in dense areas, such as the cities discussed in this paper,
they may not accurately represent racial and neighborhood boundaries.
This usage of tracts as the primary basis does allow for increased uniformity amongst the
cities, and it keeps a sufficiently small sample size such that the t-test itself is not reduced to the
point of being overwhelmed and has some value as a metric, as its value is inverse to the sample
size beyond a certain point due to the nature of the test, thus the inability to use census blocks
results in a simplification of the test and the ability to derive a meaningful result from running
this test at a statewide level.
However, one should still cast a wary eye on even these carefully selected methods for
the examination of the quantitative data assessed here. As we have seen before, one of the uses
of the interstate highway, as an entrenchment of racial borders, seems to be almost impossible to
not in this examination, as these generally do not coincide with tract borders. This function,
which is clearly and intrinsically racial is almost entirely omitted from this type of study, as it
does not examine the proximity of these tracts to one another.
Furthermore, this report may unnecessarily vilify several projects by these same methods,
as they may have taken the only viable route to reach the destinations that needed the alleviation
of congestion that the interstate system provides. For example, in Chicago many of the routes
noted that go through predominantly non-white areas are in very high density areas, and these
routes are some of the most heavily travelled in the city. However, there is a great deal of
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evidence that there was insufficient care taken to mitigate the effects of the highway system in
predominantly minority areas, such as in Phoenix.
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Final Remarks
To a great extent, both of the preceding critiques rested upon the macroscopic scale of the
undertaking, both in the statistically methods as well as in its qualitative studies. However,
though each of these rings critiques can ring true in isolation, addressing them more completely
would obscure the overall goal of this piece to study, on a national scale, the presence of racial
bias in the interstate highway planning mechanism.
In light of that goal, this study does provide a considerable degree of insight into the
usage of highway planning projects. Though there were very few instances where we could find
a willful desire to break through and obstruct neighborhoods, as had been alleged, there were
more cases, such as St. Louis or Baltimore, where the interstate highway was used as a method
of keeping a racial divide in place between whites and blacks. This runs counter to the initial
supposition that the highway was itself considered to be undesirable and deleterious to a
neighborhood, as has been asserted elsewhere.
Overall, this work does provide an interesting rebuttal of the anecdotal account of
rampant racism in these projects; however, part of these anecdotes may be inspired by the
process of neighborhood transition. Thus, more research is needed to understand exactly why
the anecdotally based literature has developed in the way that it has, as it may indicate that these
projects were detrimental and provoked a degree of neighborhood transition after they were
constructed.
Furthermore, these studies could be run with an examination of the income patterns of the
tracts as opposed to the racial composition, which could shed light on whether these issues that
were anecdotally noted are based on the perceived class of the residents. This sort of class based
discrimination may have been the effective result of prejudice; however, it appears that there
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were a scarce few examples where the interstate appears to have been prejudicially placed
through minority neighborhoods.
Overall, this essay seems largely to rebut the placement being discriminatory ipso facto.
However, the form that these roads take in minority neighborhoods is often unmitigated, which
may cause deterioration in the surrounding neighborhoods. There do appear to have been
distinct areas where a more equitable placement could have been made, but this does not have
the same degree of evidence as the initial literature may have suggested. Thus, after this
extensive research, the only clear response is that the answer to this line of enquiry is much more
nuanced than was initially expected and implied.
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Appendix: Case Study Tables (State t-tests)
Alabama

Arizona
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Arkansas

California
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Colorado

Connecticut
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Delaware

District of Columbia
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Florida

Georgia
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Illinois

Indiana
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Iowa

Kansas
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Kentucky

Louisiana
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Maine

Maryland
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Massachusetts

Michigan
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Minnesota

Missouri
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Nebraska

Nevada
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New Hampshire

New Jersey
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New Mexico

New York
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North Carolina

Ohio
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Oklahoma

Oregon

Sherman 79

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island
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South Carolina

Tennessee
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Texas

Utah
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Virginia

Washington
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West Virginia

Wisconsin
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